The problem is within the Maritime Safety Committee’s MSC.1/Circ. 1324 that defines the test gas for pressure/vacuum (P/V) valves used for certifying apparatus group IIB used on vessels that carry products defined as such in column “i” in chapter 17 of the IBC code. It clarifies MSC/Circ. 677, for the Design, Testing and Locating of Devices to Prevent the Passage of Flame into Cargo Tanks in Tankers.
Clause 2 of MSC.1/Circ. 1324 is very clear, ‘Member Governments are invited to apply the amendments to the revised standards, as amended, to ships constructed on, or after 1st January 2013 and to ships constructed before 1st January 2013, no later than the first scheduled drydocking carried out on or after 1st January 2013.’
The problem this creates for existing chemical tanker owners arises from the retrospection of the wording, which clearly is unlimited, and goes backwards beyond MSC/Circ. 677 that entered into force at the end of 1994.
A Danish manufacturer of P/V valves, Pres- Vac Engineering, argued that the amended MSC/Circ. 667 rendered valves manufactured in the era of previous MSC/Circ. 373.1 obsolete, and in need of replacement. The significant difference between the two circulars is in the test gas used to determine if a flash-back occurs during testing. Circ. 677 specified, after the amendment with Circ. 1324, an ethylene and air vapour, while Circ. 373.1 used a technical hexane and air mix.
Tests, witnessed by Lloyds Register, Copenhagen, were undertaken by Scanvent, another Danish manufacturer, which confirmed that the Circ. 373.1 valves passed the Circ. 677 procedure without any flashback using ethylene as the test media. Scanvent’s Eric Sorensen said he fully expected this to be the result. “The selfignition temperature of hexane is half that of ethylene and generates significantly more heat radiation,” he said. “There is nothing to prevent an owner taking a test specimen from a ship in dock, after which we need one to two days to test and have class sign off.”
MSC Circulars owe their legitimacy to the code to which they relate and not on their own right. Circular 677 is reliant on the IBC code, whereas Circulars 373 and 373.1 are linked to the BLG code. Chapter 8 of the IBC Code specifically states that it only applies to ships constructed on or after 1st January 1994, adding ‘unless expressly provided otherwise’. For other vessels, section 8.1.2 states ‘Ships constructed before 1st January 1994 shall comply with the requirements of chapter 8 of this Code which were in force prior to the set date.’ Clearly retrospection was not intended by the authors of the IBC code.
If the Committee had intended the amended MSC/Circ. 677 to be retrospective to vessels equipped many years prior to its introduction, it should have said, ‘Member Governments are invited to apply these standards as amended to ships constructed on, or after 1st January 2013 and to ships constructed before 1st January 2013, no later than the first scheduled drydocking carried out on, or after 1st January 2013.’ Even that is not sufficient to counter the argument that an amendment to a circular, or code, cannot extend its authority to a period before it existed.
No requirement
The Danish Maritime Authority (DMA) accepted that there is no requirement in the revised standard for existing approved equipment to be recertified; however, it maintained that the relevant valves must be recertified to MSC/Circ. 677. In doing so, it relied on Chapter II of SOLAS to provide the retrospective authority. Regulation 1.3.2, which it cited, states ‘Repairs, alterations and modifications, which substantially alter the dimensions of a ship, or the passenger accommodation spaces, or substantially increase a ship's service life and outfitting related thereto, shall meet the requirements for ships constructed on, or after 1st July 2002 in so far as the Administration deems reasonable and practicable.’
On first reading it seems unlikely that recertifying a P/V valve with a different test gas would constitute a substantial increase in a ship's service life. The DMA expressed the view that by being able to carry an extended list of chemicals, the life of the vessel will be extended. This might be considered by some to be a specious argument and open to legal challenge.
In June 2004, the IMO issued a Unified Interpretations Of Solas Chapter II-2, The FSS Code, The FTP Code and Related Fire Test Procedures, under MSC/Circ. 1120. It provides an example of substantial increase of a ship's service life - renewal of passenger accommodation spaces on one entire deck; renewed accommodation spaces should comply with chapter II-2 of SOLAS 1974, as amended. However, in this case, means of escape in the areas not subject to renewal are not required to be reviewed in the light of new requirements.
The DMA declined to provide a formal statement in which it could have formalised its position. This obfuscation is unwelcome and surprising.
Ironically, MSC.1/Circ. 1324 was introduced to correct the anomaly in MSC/Circ. 677 that allowed a tanker certified IIA to carry a mixed cargo of products designated IIA and IIB. It has succeeded in this; but has left the industry with another mess, that unless resolved quickly, could leave the industry facing high costs that it can ill afford at this stage of the economic cycle.
The question that the classification societies and administrations must answer is ‘Are you looking for IIB compliance or MSC/Circ. 677 compliance?’ They need to determine this quickly, and not take the 27 years it took to resolve the problem of mixed IIA and IIB products loaded on the same tanker.